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a b s t r a c t
Wepresent a formalization and a formal total correctness proof of aMiniSAT-like SAT solver
within the system Isabelle/HOL. The solver is based on the DPLL procedure and employs
most state-of-the-art SAT solving techniques, including the conflict-guided backjumping,
clause learning, and the two-watched unit propagation scheme. A shallow embedding into
Isabelle/HOL is used and the solver is expressed as a set of recursiveHOL functions. Based on
this specification, the Isabelle’s built-in code generator can be used to generate executable
code in several supported functional languages (Haskell, SML, and OCaml). The SAT solver
implemented in this way is, to our knowledge, the first fully formally and mechanically
verified modern SAT solver.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The propositional satisfiability problem (SAT) is the problemof deciding if there is a truth assignment underwhich a given
propositional formula (in conjunctive normal form) evaluates to true. It is a canonical NP-complete problem [3] and it holds a
central position in the field of computational complexity. The SAT problem is also important in many practical applications
such as electronic design automation, software and hardware verification, artificial intelligence, and operations research.
Thanks to recent advances in propositional solving technology, SAT solvers are becoming the tool for attacking more and
more practical problems. Most modern SAT solvers are based on the Davis–Putnam–Logemann–Loveland (DPLL) procedure
[5,4] and its modifications.
Since SAT solver are used in applications that are very sensitive (e.g., software and hardware verification), their
misbehavior could be both financially expensive and dangerous from the aspect of security. Clearly, having a trusted SAT
solving system is vital. This can be achieved in two different ways.
1. One approach is to extend an online SAT solverwith the possibility of generatingmodels of satisfiable formulas and proofs
of unsatisfiability for unsatisfiable formulas. The generatedmodels and proofs are then checked offline by an independent
trusted checker [26,7].
2. Another approach is to apply software verification techniques and verify the implementation of the SAT solver itself, so
that it becomes trusted [13,23,15].
The first approachhas successfully beenused in recent years. It is relatively easy to implement, but it has somedrawbacks.
Generating object-level proofs introduces about 10% overhead to the solver’s running time and proof checking can also take
a significant amount of time [7]. More importantly, since proofs are very large objects, they can consume up to several
gigabytes of storage space. Since proof checkers have to be trusted, they must be very simple programs so that they could
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Fig. 1. SAT verification project.
be ‘‘verified’’ only by manually inspecting their source code [7]. On the other hand, in order to handle large proof objects,
checkersmust use specialized functionality of the underlying operating system,which reduces the level of their confidence.1
In this work we take the second, harder, approach and formally verify a full implementation of a SAT solver. There are
several reasons for doing this.
1. We believe that this verification effort could help in a better theoretical understanding of how and why modern SAT
solver procedures work.
2. Verified SAT solvers can serve as the trusted kernel checkers for verifying results of other untrusted verifiers such as
BDDs, model checkers, and SMT solvers [23]. Also, verification of some SAT solver modules (e.g., Boolean constraint
propagation) can serve as a basis for creating a verified, yet efficient, proof checker for SAT.
3. The overheads of generating and storing unsatisfiability proofs can be avoided if the SAT solver itself is trusted.
4. We hope that this work contributes to the Verification Grand Challenge [25], and adds to the growing collection of non-
trivial software that has been fully formally verified.
In order to prove the correctness of a SAT solver implementation, it needs to be formalized in some meta-theory so its
properties can be analyzed by using an appropriate mathematical apparatus. In order to achieve the desired, highest level
of trust, formalization in a classical ‘‘pen-and-paper’’ fashion is not satisfactory and a mechanized and machine-checkable
formalization is required.
Results presented in this paper constitute a significant part of our SAT verification project [17], illustrated in Fig. 1. All
formalizations done within the project were made within the system Isabelle/HOL [21].2 As a part of this project, abstract
state transition systems for SAT [11,20] have been formalized. Following these formalizations, we have implemented a
modern SAT solver ArgoSAT3 in C++. Since formal verification of the real C++ codewas beyond our reach, we have developed
a corresponding SAT solver description in an imperative pseudo-language, within a tutorial on the modern SAT solving
technology [15]. This description (obtained from an executable SAT solver) was semi-mechanically verified using Hoare
logic (verification conditions were manually generated and then verified within Isabelle/HOL) [15].
In the current paper, a different approach is pursued. A shallow embedding into HOL is used, i.e., the SAT solver is
expressed as a set of recursive functions in HOL (which is, for this purpose, treated as a pure functional programming
language). From this specification, an executable SAT solver in several functional languages (e.g., Haskell, SML, OCaml) can
be automatically extracted. The extracted solver achieves amuch higher level of trust, since the whole formalization is done
within the theorem prover. In addition to this important conceptual difference, this paper also brings a formal proof of
termination of a modern solver, not previously given.
In the rest of the paper, a full, self-contained, implementation of a SAT solver within Isabelle/HOL will be presented.
However, some familiarity with modern SAT solving technology is assumed (the reader can consult tutorials given in the
literature [1,15,8,6]).
Overview of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give some background information
about the DPLL procedure and its modifications. We also give some background on program verification. In Section 3 we
introduce basic notions of the system Isabelle and formulate an underlying theory for our formalization. The central section
of the paper is Section 4 in which we present the specification of the SAT solver and introduce correctness conditions along
the way. In Section 5 we outline the correctness proof of our implementation and in Section 6 we discuss some aspects of
the proofmanagement. In Section 7we list some of the relatedwork, in Section 8we list some possible directions for further
work, and in Section 9 we draw final conclusions.
2. Background
DPLL procedure and its modifications. Most modern SAT solvers are based on the Davis–Putnam–Logemann–Loveland
(DPLL) procedure. Its original recursive version is shown in Fig. 2, where F denotes a set of propositional clauses tested
for satisfiability and F [l →⊤] denotes the formula obtained from F by substituting the literal lwith⊤, its opposite literal l
1 For example, the proof checker used in SAT competitions uses Linux’s mmap functionality [7].
2 The original proof documents are available online [14].
3 The web page of ArgoSAT is http://argo.matf.bg.ac.rs.
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function dpll (F : Formula) : (SAT, UNSAT)
begin
if F is empty then
return SAT
else if there is an empty clause in F then
return UNSAT
else if there is a pure literal l in F then
return dpll(F [l →⊤])
else there is a unit clause [l] in F then
return dpll(F [l →⊤])
else begin
select a literal l occurring in F
if dpll(F [l →⊤]) = SAT then
return SAT
else
return dpll(F [l →⊥])
end
end
Fig. 2. DPLL algorithm — recursive definition.
with⊥, and simplifying afterwards. A literal is pure if it occurs in the formula but its opposite literal does not occur. A clause
is unit if it contains only one literal. This recursive implementation is practically unusable for larger formulae and therefore
it is not used in modern SAT solvers, nor in this paper.
Startingwith thework on the GRASP and SATO systems [19,24] and continuingwith Chaff, BerkMin andMiniSAT [18,9,6],
the spectacular improvements in the performance of DPLL-based SAT solvers achieved in the last years are due to (i) several
conceptual enhancements of the original DPLL procedure, such as backjumping (a form of non-chronological backtracking),
conflict-driven lemma learning, and restarts, (ii) advanced heuristic components (e.g., literal selection strategies) and
(iii) better implementation techniques, such as the two-watched literals scheme for unit propagation. These advances make
it possible to decide satisfiability of some industrial SAT problemswith tens of thousands of variables andmillions of clauses.
Abstract state transition systems for SAT. During the last few years two state transition systems which model modern
DPLL-based SAT solvers and related SMT solvers have been published [20,11]. These descriptions define the top-level
architecture of solvers as a mathematical object that can be grasped as a whole and fruitfully reasoned about. Both systems
are accompanied by pen-and-paper correctness and termination proofs. Although they succinctly and accurately capture
all major aspects of the solvers’ global operation, they are still high level and far from the actual implementations. Both
systems model the solver behavior as transitions between states that represent the values of global variables of the solver.
These include the set of clauses F and the corresponding assertion trail M . Transitions between states are performed only
by using precisely defined transition rules. The solving process is finished when no transition rule applies and the final state
is reached.
The system of Nieuwenhuis et al. [20] is very coarse. It can capture many different strategies seen in the state-of-the-art
SAT solvers, but this comes at a price. Several important aspects still have to be specified in order to build the implementation
based on the given set of rules.
The system of Krstic and Goel [11] gives amore detailed description of some parts of the solving process (particularly the
conflict analysis phase) than the previous one. Since this system is used as a basis of the implementation given in this paper,
we list its transition rules in Fig. 3. Together with the formula F and the trail M , the state of the solver is characterized by
the conflict analysis set C which is either the set of literals or the distinguished symbol no_cflct. The input to the system is
an arbitrary set of clauses F0, modeled as the initial state in which F = F0, M = [ ], and C=no_cflct. The rules have guarded
assignment form: above the line is the condition that enables the application of the rule, below the line is the update to the
state variables.
Formal program verification. Formal program verification is the process of proving that a computer program meets its
specification which formally describes the expected program behavior. Early results date back to the 1950s and pioneers
in this field were A. Turing, J. von Neumann and J. McCarthy. In the late 1960s R. Floyd introduced equational reasoning
on flowcharts for proving program correctness and T. Hoare introduced axiomatic semantics for programming constructs.
Following the lessons from major software failures in recent years, an increasing amount of effort is being invested in this
field.
To achieve the highest level of trust,mechanically checkable formal proofs of correctness are required.Many fundamental
algorithms and properties of data structures have been formalized and verified in this way. Also, a lot of work has been
devoted to formalization of programming language semantics, compilers, communication protocols, security protocols, etc.
Many of the early results in mechanical program verification were carried out by Boyer and Moore using their theorem
prover. Theoremprovers that aremost commonly used for program verification nowadays are Isabelle, HOL, Coq, PVS, Nuprl,
etc. A large collection of formalized theories (of both puremathematics and computer science) mechanically checked by the
theorem prover Isabelle is available in Archive of formal proofs (http://afp.sourceforge.net).
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Decide:
l ∈ F l, l /∈ M
M := M ld
UnitPropag:
l ∨ l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk ∈ F l1, . . . , lk ∈ M l, l /∈ M
M := M l
Conflict:
C = no_cflct l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk ∈ F l1, . . . , lk ∈ M
C := {l1, . . . , lk}
Explain:
l ∈ C l ∨ l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk ∈ F l1, . . . , lk ≺ l
C := C ∪ {l1, . . . , lk} \ {l}
Learn:
C = {l1, . . . , lk} l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk /∈ F
F := F ∪ {l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk}
Backjump:
C = {l, l1, . . . , lk} l ∨ l1 ∨ . . . ∨ lk ∈ F level l > m ≥ level li
C := no_cflct M := M [m] l
Forget:
C = no_cflct c ∈ F F \ c  c
F := F \ c
Restart:
C = no_cflct
M := M [0]
Fig. 3. Rules of dpll as given by Krstić and Goel [11].
Formal program verification by shallow embedding into HOL. Shallow embedding into higher-order logic is a technique
that is widely used for verification, despite its well-known limitations [2]. This success is due in part to the simplicity of the
approach: a formal model of the operational or denotational semantics of the language is not required and many technical
difficulties (e.g., the representation of binders) are avoided altogether. Furthermore, the proof methods used are mainly
standard induction principles and equational reasoning, and no specialized program logic (e.g., Hoare logic) is necessary.
The specifications may be turned into executable code directly bymeans of code generation [10]. Themain drawback of this
approach is that all programs must be expressed as purely functional. As the notion of side-effect is alien to the world of
HOL functions, programswith imperative updates of references or arrays cannot be expressed directly which heavily effects
the efficiency of the generated code. Still, approaches to overcome these difficulties have been proposed recently [2].
3. Underlying theory
In order to create and reason about the correctness of a SAT solver, we have to formally define some basic notions of
propositional logic. The full formalizationhas beenmade in the higher-order logic of the system Isabelle andbasic knowledge
about this system is assumed in the rest of the paper. We will use a syntax similar to the syntax used in Isabelle/HOL.
Formulas and logical connectives of this logic (∧, ∨, ¬, −→,←→) are written in the usual way. Function applications are
written in prefix form, as in (f x1 . . . xn). Existential quantification is denoted by ∃ x. ... and universal quantification by
∀ x. ....
We assume that the underlying theorywe are defining includes the theory of ordered pairs, lists, (finite) sets, and optional
data-types (all of them are built-in in Isabelle/HOL). We also assume that record data-types are available. Syntax of these
operations is summarized in the first column of Fig. 4 and the semantics is informally described in the second column.
Basic types. Apart from the basic built-in types, we introduce the types used in propositional logic of CNF formulas as given
by Definition 1.
Definition 1.
Variable natural number.
Literal either a positive variable (Pos vbl) or a negative variable (Neg vbl)
Clause a list of literals
Formula a list of clauses
Valuation a list of literals
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bool the Boolean type with values True and False
ExtendedBool the extended Boolean type with values True, False and Undef
nat the type of natural numbers
(′a×′ b) the type of ordered pairs with elements of types ′a and ′b
(a, b) the ordered pair of elements a and b
′a list the type of lists with elements of type ′a
[ ] the empty list
[e1, . . . , en] the list of n given elements e1, . . . , en
e# list the list obtained by prepending the element e to the list list
list1@list2 the list obtained by appending the lists list1 and list2
e ∈ list e is a member of the list list
(removeAll e list) the list obtained by removing all occurrences of the element e
from the list list
(list_diff list1 list2) the list obtained from the list list1 by removing all elements
of the list list2 from it
(fst list), (hd list) the first element of the list list
(tl list) the list obtained by removing the first element of the list list
list ! n the n-th element of the list list
(last list) the last element in the nonempty list list
(length list) the length of the list list
(distinct list) check if the list list contains no repeating elements
(remdups list) the list obtained from the list list by removing
all its duplicate elements
(filter P list) the list obtained from the list list by taking
all its elements that satisfy the condition P
(map f list) the list obtained from the list list by applying
the function f to all its elements
(prefixToElement e list) the prefix of the list list up to the first occurrence
of the element e (including it)
a ≺list b the element a precedes the element b in the list list
′a set the type of sets with elements of type ′a
{} the empty set
e ∈ set e is a member of the set set
set1 ∪ set2 the set union of set1 and set2
|set| the number of elements in the set set
′a option the type of optional values of the type ′a
Some a the optional value exists and is a
None the optional value does not exist
f (x := y) the mapping obtained from the mapping f by setting
the value of x to y
recLf1 := a1, . . . , fk := akM the record obtained from the record rec by setting
the values of fields f1, . . . , fk to values a1, . . . , ak,
respectively
Fig. 4. Summary of Isabelle’s basic types and operations.
Or in Isabelle’s syntax:
types Variable = nat
datatype Literal = Pos Variable | Neg Variable
types Clause = "Literal list"
types Formula = "Clause list"
types Valuation = "Literal list"
Alternatively, (multi)sets could have been used instead of lists (e.g., valuations could have been defined as sets of literals),
but we opted for lists since they more closely resemble real SAT solver implementations.
For the sake of readability, we will sometime omit printing types and use the following naming convention: literals
(i.e., variables of the type Literal) are denoted by l (e.g., l, l′, l0, l1, l2, . . .), variables by vbl, clauses by c , formulae by F , and
valuations by v.
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Most of the following definitions are formalized by using primitive recursion, so that they can be used to generate
executable code. However, in order to simplify the presentation and improve readability we give their characterizations
in an informal way and omit the Isabelle code.
Definition 2. The opposite literal of a literal l, denoted l, is defined by: Pos vbl = Neg vbl, Neg vbl = Pos vbl.
We abuse the notation and overload some symbols. For example, the symbol ∈ denotes both set membership and list
membership. It is also used to denote that a literal occurs in a formula.
Definition 3. A formula F contains a literal l (i.e., a literal l occurs in a formula F ), denoted l ∈ F , iff ∃c. c ∈ F ∧ l ∈ c.
The symbol vars is also overloaded and denotes the set of variables occurring in a clause, in a formula, or in a valuation.
Definition 4. The set of variables that occur in a clause c is denoted by (vars c). The set of variables that occur in a formula F is
denoted (vars F). The set of variables that occur in a valuation v is denoted (vars v).
The semantics is introduced by the following definitions.
Definition 5. A literal l is true in a valuation v, denoted v  l, iff l ∈ v. A clause c is true in a valuation v, denoted v  c , iff
∃l. l ∈ c ∧ v  l. A formula F is true in a valuation v, denoted v  F , iff ∀c. c ∈ F ⇒ v  c .
We will write v 2 l to denote that l is not true in v (note that it does not mean that l is false in v), v 2 c to denote that c
is not true in v, and v 2 F to denote that F is not true in v. We will say that l (or c , or F ) is unsatisfied in v.
Definition 6. A literal l is false in a valuation v, denoted v ¬ l, iff l ∈ v. A clause c is false in a valuation v, denoted v ¬ c ,
iff ∀l. l ∈ c ⇒ v ¬ l. A formula F is false in a valuation v, denoted v ¬ F , iff ∃c. c ∈ F ∧ v ¬ c.
We will write v 2¬ l to denote that l is not false in v, v 2¬ c to denote that c is not false in v, and v 2¬ F to denote that
F is not false in v. We will say that l (or c , or F ) is unfalsified in v.
Definition 7. A valuation v is inconsistent, denoted (inconsistent v), iff it contains both literal and its opposite i.e., iff
∃l. v  l ∧ v  l. A valuation is consistent, denoted (consistent v), iff it is not inconsistent.
Definition 8. Amodel of a formula F is a consistent valuation underwhich F is true. A formula F is satisfiable, denoted (sat F),
iff it has a model i.e., ∃v. (consistent v) ∧ v  F .
Definition 9. A formula F entails a clause c , denoted F  c , iff c is true in every model of F . A formula F entails a literal l,
denoted F  l, iff l is true in every model of F . A formula F entails valuation v, denoted F  v, iff it entails all its literals i.e.,
∀l. l ∈ v ⇒ F  l. A formula F1 entails a formula F2 denoted F1  F2, if every model of F1 is a model of F2.
Definition 10. Formulae F1 and F2 are logically equivalent, denoted F1 ≡ F2, iff any model of F1 is a model of F2 and vice
versa, i.e., iff F1  F2 and F2  F1.
Definition 11. A clause c is unit in a valuation vwith a unit literal l, denoted (isUnit c l v) iff l ∈ c , v 2 l, v 2¬ l and v ¬ (c \ l)
(i.e., ∀l′. l′ ∈ c ∧ l′ ≠ l ⇒ v ¬ l′).
Definition 12. A clause c is a reason for propagation of literal l in valuation v, denoted (isReason c l v) iff l ∈ c , v  l,
v ¬ (c \ l), and for each literal l′ ∈ (c \ l), the literal l′ precedes l in v.
Definition 13. The resolvent of clauses c1 and c2 over the literal l, denoted (resolvent c1 c2 l) is the clause (c1 \ l)@(c2 \ l).
Definition 14. A clause c is a tautological clause, denoted (clauseTautology c), if it contains both a literal and its opposite
(i.e., ∃ l. l ∈ c ∧ l ∈ c).
Definition 15. The conversion of a valuation v to a formula ⟨v⟩ is the list that contains all single literal clausesmade of literals
from v.
Assertion trail. In order to build a non-recursive implementation of the dpll algorithm, the notion of valuation should be
slightly extended. During the solving process, the solver should keep track of the current partial valuation. In that valuation,
some literals are called decision literals. Non-decision literals are called implied literals. These check-pointed sequences that
represent valuations with marked decision literals will be stored in the data structure called the assertion trail. All literals
that belong to the trail will be called asserted literals. The assertion trail operates as a stack and literals are always added and
removed from its top. We extend the underlying theory with the type LiteralTrail, as given by Definition 16:
Definition 16.
LiteralTrail a list of literals, with some of them marked as decision literals.
We will denote variables of the type LiteralTrail byM (e.g.,M,M ′,M0, . . .).
Example 1. A trail M could be [+1, |−2,+6, |+5,−3,+4, |−7]. The symbol + is written instead of the constructor Pos,
the symbol− instead of Neg and the decision literals are marked with the symbol | on their left hand side.
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A trail can be implemented, for example, as a list of (Literal, bool) ordered pairs and all following definitions will
be based on this specific implementation. Our SAT solver implementation effectively uses the LiteralTrail datatype and so
we also show its Isabelle formalization.
types LiteralTrail = "(Literal × bool) list"
Definition 17. For a trail element a, (element a) denotes the first (Literal) component and (isDecision a) denotes the second
(Boolean) component. For a trailM , (elementsM) (abbreviated as M) denotes the list of all its elements and (decisionsM)
denotes the list of all its marked elements (i.e., of all its decision literals).
definition element :: "(Literal × bool) ⇒ Literal"
where "element x = fst x"
definition isDecision :: "(Literal × bool) ⇒ bool"
where "isDecision x = snd x"
definition elements :: "LiteralTrail ⇒ Literal list"
where "elements M = map element M"
definition decisions :: "LiteralTrail ⇒ Literal list"
where "decisions trail = filter (λ e. isDecision e) trail"
Definition 18. (decisionsTo M l) is the list of all marked elements from a trail M that precede the first occurrence of the
element l, including l if it is marked.
definition decisionsTo :: "Literal ⇒ LiteralTrail ⇒ Literal list"
where
"decisionsTo e trail = decisions (prefixToElement e trail)"
Example 2. For the trail given in Example 1, (decisions M) = [−2,+5,−7], (decisionsTo M + 4) = [−2,+5], and
(decisionsToM − 7)= [−2,+5,−7].
Definition 19. The current level for a trail M , denoted (currentLevel M), is the number of marked literals in M , i.e.,
(currentLevelM) = (length (decisionsM)).
definition currentLevel :: "LiteralTrail ⇒ nat"
where
"currentLevel trail = length (decisions trail)"
Definition 20. The decision level of a literal l in a trail M , denoted (level l M), is the number of marked literals in the trail
that precede the first occurrence of l, including l if it is marked, i.e., (level l M) = (length (decisionsToM l)).
definition elementLevel :: "Literal ⇒ LiteralTrail ⇒ nat"
where
"elementLevel e trail = length (decisionsTo e trail)"
Definition 21. (prefixToLevel M level) is the prefix of a trail M containing all elements of M with levels less than or equal
to level.
definition prefixToLevel :: "nat ⇒ LiteralTrail ⇒ LiteralTrail"
Example 3. For the trail in Example 1, (level + 1 M) = 0, (level + 4 M) = 2, (level − 7 M) = 3, (currentLevel M) = 3,
(prefixToLevelM 1) = [+1, |+2,+6].
Definition 22. The last asserted literal of a clause c , denoted (lastAssertedLiteral c M), is the literal from c that is in M , such
that no other literal from c comes after it in M .
The function isLastAssertedLiteral is used to check if the given literal is the last asserted literal of the given clause in the
given valuation.
definition isLastAssertedLiteral::"Literal ⇒ Literal list ⇒ Valuation ⇒ bool"
where
"isLastAssertedLiteral literal clause valuation =
literal ∈ clause ∧ valuation  literal ∧
(∀ literal’. literal’ ∈ clause ∧ literal’ ≠ literal −→
literal ⊀valuation literal’)"
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The function getLastAssertedLiteral is used to detect the last asserted literal of the given clause in the given valuation.
definition getLastAssertedLiteral :: "Clause ⇒ Valuation ⇒ Literal"
where
"getLastAssertedLiteral clause valuation =
last (filter (λ l. l ∈ clause) valuation)"
Example 4. Let c be [+4,+6,−3] andM is the trail from Example 1. Then, (lastAssertedLiteral c M) = +4.
4. SAT solver formalization
In this section we will present a formalized implementation of a SAT solver within the underlying theory introduced
in Section 3. Different concepts and algorithms will be described in separate subsections. Together with the solver
implementation we will give conditions that describe its variables and their relationships that must be invariant for the
solver functions. These invariants fully characterize the role of some variables in the system and help understanding
the whole system. Because invariants are listed simultaneously with the implementation, the style used can be seen as
implementation driven by its specification.
Note that the following solver description is very formal and concise, and that some previous knowledge about the SAT
solving technology is assumed. Useful tutorial descriptions can be found in the literature (e.g., [1,15,8,6]).
4.1. Solver state
In an imperative or object-oriented language, the state of the solver is represented by using global or class variables.
Functions of the solver access and change these variables as their side-effects. In HOL, functions cannot have side-effects, so
the solver state must be wrapped up in a record and passed around with each function call. Therefore, all functions in our
functional implementation will receive the current solver state as their last parameter and return the modified state along
with their result. However, function definitionswill usemonadic Haskell-style do syntax recently supported by Isabelle/HOL
[2] and hide explicit state changes. For each component XXX of the state basic operations readXXX and updateXXXwill be
provided.
The state of the solver is represented by the following record:
record State =
"getSATFlag" :: ExtendedBool
"getF" :: Formula
"getM" :: LiteralTrail
"getConflictFlag" :: bool
"getConflictClause" :: pClause
"getQ" :: "Literal list"
"getReason" :: "Literal ⇒ pClause option"
"getWatch1" :: "pClause ⇒ Literal option"
"getWatch2" :: "pClause ⇒ Literal option"
"getWatchList" :: "Literal ⇒ pClause list"
"getC" :: Clause
"getCl" :: Literal
"getCll" :: Literal
The data-typepClause is just a synonym fornat and it indicates ‘‘pointers’’ to clauses i.e., indices of clauses in the clause
list representing the formula.
Basic variables of the solver state are the following.
- The variable SATFlag reflects the status of the solving process and it remains Undef until the formula which is being
solved is detected to be satisfiable (when SATFlag is set to True) or to be unsatisfiable (when SATFlag is set to False).
Its characterization will be the main partial correctness result and it will be proved in Section 5.
Inv[SATFlag]4:
SATFlag = True ↔ (sat F0) ∧ SATFlag = False ↔ ¬(sat F0),
where F0 is the formula tested for satisfiability.
4 We will say that a state satisfies an invariant and that an invariant holds in a state if the components (getXXX) of the state satisfy the condition given
by the invariant.
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- The literal trailM contains the current partial valuation (i.e., M is the current partial valuation). It is characterized by the
following invariants:
Inv[Mconsistent]:
(consistent M)
Inv[Mdistinct]:
(distinct M),
which ensure thatM also represents a mapping of some variables to their truth values.
The trailM contains literals whose variables are in the initial formula F0 and literals whose variables are in the special
set of decision variables (denoted by decisionVars and used in decide operation formalized in Section 4.6). Note that these
two sets usually coincide, but this is not necessarily the case. This domain property ofM is given by the following invariant.
Inv[Mvars]:
(varsM) ⊆ (vars F0) ∪ decisionVars
- The formula F will be referred to as the current set of clauses. It changes during the solving process and its clauses are either
(simplified) clauses of the initial formula F0 or its consequences that are learned during the solving process. Since initial
clauses are built from literals of F0 and learned clauses are built from literals of M , the formula F satisfies the following
domain property.
Inv[Fvars]:
(vars F) ⊆ (vars F0) ∪ decisionVars
All clauses in F will have at least two different literals. Single literal clauses [l]will never be added to F , but instead their
only literal l will be immediately added to M . Indeed, adding a single literal clause [l] to F would be useless because its
only literal lmust be contained in every satisfying valuation and [l] is automatically satisfied when l is asserted. To ensure
correctness, once these literals are added toM , they must never get removed from it. This is the case in the implementation
we provide, since all these literals will be asserted at the decision level zero of the trailM which never gets backtracked.
As said, all clauses in F are logical consequences of F0. Also, the decision level zero of the trailM contains literals that are
logical consequences of the formula F0. The following invariant describing the relation between the initial formula F0, the
formula F , and the trail M plays a very important role in the soundness and completeness of the solving process. It states
that the formula F0 is fully characterized by the formula F and the decision level zero of the trailM .
Inv[equivalent]:
F0 ≡ F @ ⟨ prefixToLevel 0M⟩
The fact that F contains only clauses with two or more different literals also simplifies the implementation of the two-
watched literal scheme (see Section 4.4.1).
Other components of the solver state are used in specific phases of the solving process and will be explained in the
following sections.
4.2. Initialization
In this section we describe the process of initializing the solver state by the given formula F0 tested for satisfiability.
The function initialize calls addClause for each clause in F0 which appropriately updates the solver state.
primrec initialize :: "Formula ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"initialize [] = return ()"
| "initialize (clause # formula) =
do
addClause clause;
initialize formula
done
The function initialize is initially called only for initialState, so there are no decision literals inM when it is called.
definition initialState :: "State"
where
"initialState =L getSATFlag = Undef,
getF = [],
getM = [],
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getConflictFlag = False,
getConflictClause = 0,
getQ = [],
getWatch1 = λ c. None,
getWatch2 = λ c. None,
getWatchList = λ l. [],
getReason = λ l. None,
getC = arbitrary,
getCl = arbitrary,
getCll = arbitraryM
"
Beforewe introduce the function addClause, we define an auxiliary function removeFalseLiterals used to simplify clauses.
It removes all literals from the given clause that are false in the given valuation.
definition removeFalseLiterals :: "Clause ⇒ Valuation ⇒ Clause"
where
"removeFalseLiterals clause valuation =
filter (λ l. valuation 2¬ l) clause"
The function addClause (called only by initialize) preprocesses the clause by removing its repeated literals and removing
its literals that are false in the current trailM . After this, several cases arise.
- If the clause is satisfied in the current trailM , it is just skipped. The rationale for this is that if there is a satisfying valuation
for F0, it will be an extension of the current trailM , so it will also satisfy the clause that was skipped.
- If the clause is empty after preprocessing, the formula F0 is unsatisfiable and SATFlag is set to False, since the empty clause
cannot be satisfied in any valuation.
- Tautological clauses (i.e., clauses containing both a literal and its opposite) are also skipped since they can always be
satisfied.
The two remaining cases actually update F orM .
1. As described, clauses [l] containing only a single literal l are treated in a special way. Since they can only be satisfied if
their literal l is true inM , l it is immediately added toM . Then a round of unit propagation (see Section 4.5) is performed,
which can infer further consequences of asserting l.
2. Clauses containing more than one literal are added to F and data structures related to the two-watched literal scheme
are appropriately initialized (see Section 4.4.1).
definition addClause :: "Clause ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"addClause clause =
do
M ← readM;
let clause’ = (remdups (removeFalseLiterals clause (elements M)));
(if (¬ clauseTrue clause’ (elements M)) then
(if clause’=[] then
updateSATFlag False
else (if (length clause’ = 1) then
do
assertLiteral (hd clause’) False;
exhaustiveUnitPropagate
done
else (if (¬ clauseTautology clause’) then
do
F ← readF;
let clauseIndex = length F;
updateF (F @ [clause’]);
setWatch1 clauseIndex (clause’ ! 0);
setWatch2 clauseIndex (clause’ ! 1)
done
)))
)
done
"
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4.3. Top level solver operation
The only function of the solver that end-users are expected to call is the function solve. First it performs initialization
and then it performs the main solver loop while the status of the solving process (given by the variable SATFlag) is Undef.
The first time SATFlag changes, the main solver loop stops and the current value of SATFlag is the final solver result.
definition solve :: "Formula ⇒ State ⇒ State × ExtendedBool"
where
"solveFormula F0 =
do
initialize F0;
solveLoop (vars F0);
readSATFlag
done
"
function (domintros, tailrec)
solveLoop :: "Variable set ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"solve_loop decisionVars =
do
SATFlag ← readSATFlag;
(if (SATFlag = Undef) then
do
solveLoopBody decisionVars;
solveLoop decisionVars
done
)
done
"
by pat_completeness auto
Note that the solve_loop is defined by general recursion, so its termination is not trivial and it will be discussed later.
The body of the solver loop begins with a round of exhaustive unit propagation. After that, four different cases arise.
1. It has been detected thatM ¬ F . In that case we say that a conflict occurred.
(a) If there are no decision literals inM , we say that a conflict at decision level zero occurred and it is determined that the
formula F0 is unsatisfiable. In that case, SATFlag is set to False.
(b) If there are some decision literals inM , then the conflict analysis and resolving procedure is performed (see Section 4.7).
2. It has been detected thatM 2¬ F .
(a) If all variables from the fixed variable set decisionVars are defined in the current trail M , it is determined that the
formula is satisfiable. In that case, SATFlag is set to True. The set decisionVars must meet additional requirements in
order to guarantee the soundness of this conclusion. For example, it suffices that (vars F0) ⊆ decisionVars, as is the
case in our implementation.
(b) If there are some decision variables that are undefined inM , a new decision is made (see Section 4.6) and a decision
literal is asserted.
The detection of clauses of F that are false in M or unit in M must be done efficiently so that it does not become the
bottleneck of the whole solver. An optimized way to achieve this is given in Section 4.4.
definition solveLoopBody :: "Variable set ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"solveLoopBody decisionVars =
do
exhaustiveUnitPropagate;
conflictFlag ← readConflictFlag;
M ← readM;
(if conflictFlag then
(if (currentLevel M) = 0 then
updateSATFlag FALSE
else
do
applyConflict;
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explainUIP;
applyLearn;
applyBackjump
done
)
else
(if (vars (elements M) ⊇ decisionVars) then
updateSATFlag TRUE
else
applyDecide decisionVars
)
)
done
"
4.4. Conflict and unit clause detection
Each time a literal is added toM , the formula F is checked for the existence of unit or false clauses. Results of this check
are stored in the following state variables.
- The variable conflictFlag is set when it is determined that the current set of clauses F is false in the valuation M . The
invariant that fully characterizes it is:
Inv[conflictFlagDef]:
conflictFlag ←→ M ¬ F
- The number conflictClause is the index of a clause in F that is false in the valuation M . Its defining invariant is:
Inv[conflictClauseDef]:
conflictFlag −→ conflictClause < |F | ∧ M ¬ (F ! conflictClause)
- The list Q is a list of all literals that are unit literals for clauses in F which are unit clauses with respect to the valuationM . These literals are ready to be asserted inM as a result of the unit propagation operation. The unit propagation queue
Q is fully characterized by the following invariant.
Inv[QDef]:
¬conflictFlag −→ (∀l. l ∈ Q ←→ (∃c. c ∈ F ∧ (isUnitClause c l M)))
Note that this condition guarantees the completeness for unit propagation i.e., it guarantees that all unit literals for unit
clauses in F are contained in Q . This is not necessary for the soundness nor completeness of the whole procedure, but, if
satisfied, leads to better efficiency.
Also, there should be no repeated elements in Q .
Inv[Qdistinct]:
(distinct Q )
As Q is built of literals of F its domain (its set of variables) is included in the domain of F .
Inv[Qvars]
(vars Q ) ⊆ (vars F0) ∪ decisionVars
- The mapping reason maps literals in Q to indices of clauses in F for which they are the unit literals. Since this mapping
does not change when the literals from Q get asserted inM , it continues to map non-decision literals ofM to indices of
clauses in F that are reasons for their propagation. Notice that no reason clauses can be attached to the literals at the
decision level zero. This is because literals at the decision level zero have a special role in the solving process, as they can
get asserted by propagating single literal clauses which are not explicitly stored in F , as described in Section 4.1. All this
is characterized by the following complex invariant.
Inv[reasonDef]:
((currentLevelM) > 0 −→ ∀l. l ∈ Q −→
(∃c. (reason l) = (Some c) ∧ c < |F | ∧ (isUnit (F ! c) l M))) ∧
(∀l. l ∈ M ∧ l /∈ (decisionsM) ∧ (level l) > 0 −→
(∃c. (reason l) = (Some c) ∧ c < |F | ∧ (isReason (F ! c) l M)))
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4.4.1. Two-watched literal scheme
An efficient way to check for false and unit clauses is by using the two-watched literal scheme. It introduces the following
variables to the state.
• Mappingswatch1 andwatch2 assign two distinguished literals to each clause of F . This condition is imposed through the
following invariants.
Inv[watchesEl]:
∀c. c < |F | −→ ∃w1w2. (watch1 c) = (Somew1) ∧ w1 ∈ F ! c ∧
(watch2 c) = (Somew2) ∧ w2 ∈ F ! c
Inv[watchesDiffer]:
∀c. c < |F | −→ (watch1 c) ≠ (watch2 c)
• The mapping watchList assigns to each literal l a list of clause indices in F that represent clauses in which l is a watched
literal. This is imposed by the following invariants.
Inv[watchListsDef]:
∀l c. c ∈ (watchList l)←→
c < |F | ∧ (watch1 c) = (Some l) ∨ (watch2 c) = (Some l)
It also holds that watch lists do not contain repeated clauses.
Inv[watchListsDistinct]:
∀l. (distinct (watchList l))
Next, we describe the function assertLiteral that adds the given literal (either decision or implied) to the trail M . The
variables conflictFlag, conflictClause, Q, and reason are then updated by using the two-watched literal propagation scheme
encoded by the function notifyWatches.
definition assertLiteral :: "Literal ⇒ bool ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"assertLiteral literal decision =
do
M ← readM;
updateM (M @ [(literal, decision)]);
notifyWatches (opposite literal)
done
"
Before we introduce and explain the function notifyWatches, we introduce several auxiliary functions.
Functions setWatch1 and setWatch2 promote the given literal to be a new watched literal of the given clause and then
add that clause to its watch list.5
definition addToWatchList :: "Literal ⇒ pClause ⇒ State ⇒ State"
"addToWatchList literal clause =
updateWatchList literal (λ watchList. clause # watchList)
"
definition setWatch1 :: "pClause ⇒ Literal ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"setWatch1 clause literal =
do
updateWatch1 clause (Some literal);
addToWatchList literal clause
done
"
The function swapWatches swaps the two watched literals of the given clause.
5 Only setWatch1 is listed since setWatch2 is similar.
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definition swapWatches :: "pClause ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"swapWatches clause =
do
wa ← readWatch1 clause; wb ← readWatch2 clause;
updateWatch1 clause wb; updateWatch2 clause wa
done
"
The functiongetNonWatchedUnfalsifiedLiteral checks if there is a literal in the given clause, other then itswatched literals,
which is not false inM .
primrec getNonWatchedUnfalseLiteral ::
"Clause ⇒ Literal ⇒ Literal ⇒ LiteralTrail ⇒ Literal option"
where
"getNonWatchedUnfalseLiteral [] w1 w2 M = None"
| "getNonWatchedUnfalseLiteral (literal # clause) w1 w2 M =
(if literal ≠ w1 ∧ literal ≠ w2 ∧ (elements M) 2¬ literal then
Some literal
else
getNonWatchedUnfalseLiteral clause w1 w2 M
)
"
Next, we explain the essence of the two-watched literal scheme encoded in the functions notifyWatches and
notifyWatchesLoop. The two-watched literal scheme relies on the fact that a watched literal of a clause can be false in M
only when the clause is either true, false or unit inM . In all other cases (when it is undefined and is not unit), both watched
literals of the clause are known to be unfalsified. This is formalized by the following invariant (with two instances for i = 1
and i = 2).
∀c. c < |F | −→ M ¬ (watchi c) −→
(∃l. l ∈ c ∧ M  l ∧ level l ≤ level (watchi c)) ∨
(∀l. l ∈ c ∧ l ≠ (watch1 c) ∧ l ≠ (watch2 c) −→
M ¬ l ∧ level l ≤ level (watchi c)).
Note that the additional conditions imposed on the literal levels are required only for the correctness of backjumping, as
described in Section 4.7.
During the assertLiteral operation, the trailM gets extended by a literal l. When this happens, all clauses that do not have l
as their watched literal still satisfy the condition of Inv[watchDef] and they cannot be unit nor false in the extended trail. The
only clauses that could have becomeunit or false are the ones that have l as theirwatched literal. These clauses are exactly the
ones whose indices are contained in (watchList l). The function notifyWatches calls the function notifyWatchesLoop which
traverses this list and processes all clauses represented by it. In order to simplify the implementation, for each processed
clause index c , watches are swapped if necessary so that it is ensured that (watch2 c) = l and so (watch2 c) is false. The
following cases may further arise:
1. If it can be quickly detected that the clause F ! c contains a true literal t , there is no need to change its watches, since it
satisfies the condition of Inv[watchDef] for the extended trail. In order to achieve high performance, this check should be
done only by using the clause index and other data structures which are most of the time present in the processor cache,
without accessing the clause itself. The older solvers checked only if (watch1 c) is true in M and this is the case in the
implementation we provide. Some new solvers sometimes cache some arbitrary literals of the clause and check if they
are true inM .
2. If a quick check does not detect a true literal t , then the clause is accessed and its other literals are examined by the
function getUnfalsifiedNonWatchedLiteral.
(a) If there exists a non-watched literal l that is not false inM , it becomes a new (watch2 c).
(b) If all non-watched literals and (watch1 c) are false in M , then the whole clause is false and conflictFlag is raised. The
watches are not changed, since they will both become undefined in M , if the backjump operation is performed (see
Section 4.7).
(c) If all non-watched literals are false in M , but (watch1 c) is undefined, then the clause just became a unit clause and
(watch1 c) is enqueued in Q for propagation (if it is not already present there). The reason for its propagation is set to
c. The watches are not changed, as the clause will have a true literal (watch1 c) after propagation.
When a literal which was not watched becomes a new (watch2 c), the literal l stops being the watched literal of c and the
clause index c should be removed from its watch list. Since this happens many time during the traversal performed by the
F. Marić / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 4333–4356 4347
notifyWatchesLoop, it turns out that it is more efficient to regenerate the newwatch list for the literal l, then to do successive
remove operations instead. This is the role of the newWl parameter in the notifyWatchesLoop function.
definition notifyWatches :: "Literal ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"notifyWatches literal =
do
wl ← readWatchList literal;
notifyWatchesLoop literal wl []
done
"
primrec notifyWatchesLoop ::
"Literal ⇒ pClause list ⇒ pClause list ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"notifyWatchesLoop literal [] newWl =
updateWatchList literal (λ wl. newWl)"
| "notifyWatchesLoop literal (clause # list’) newWl =
do
w1’ ← readWatch1 clause; w2’ ← readWatch2 clause;
if (Some literal = w1’) then (swapWatches clause);
(case w1’ of Some w1 ⇒ (case w2’ of Some w2 ⇒ (
do
M ← readM;
(if literalTrue w1 (elements M) then
notifyWatchesLoop literal list’ (clause # newWl)
else
do
F ← readF;
let ul = getNonWatchedUnfalseLiteral (F!clause) w1 w2 M in
(case ul of
Some l’ ⇒
do
setWatch2 clause l’;
notifyWatchesLoop literal list’ newWl
done
| None ⇒
(if (literalFalse w1 (elements M)) then
do
updateConflictFlag True;
updateConflictClause clause;
notifyWatchesLoop literal list’ (clause # newWl)
done
else
do
Q ← readQ;
if (¬ w1 el Q) then (updateQ (Q @ [w1]));
updateReason w1 clause;
notifyWatchesLoop literal list’ (clause # newWl)
done
)
)
done
)
done
)))
done
"
The invariants Inv[watchListsDef] and Inv[watchesEl] together guarantee that for each clause there will always be two
watched literals (hence, the missing None branches in the case expressions are indeed not needed).
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4.5. Unit propagation
The operation of unit propagation asserts unit literals of unit clauses of F . Since the two-watched literal scheme is
complete for false and unit clause detection (as the function assertLiteral preserves Inv[conflictFlagDef] and Inv[QDef]), all
unit literals of clauses in F can be found in Q . This makes unit propagation a rather trivial operation — literals are picked
from Q and asserted until Q is emptied or until a conflict is detected.
definition applyUnitPropagate :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"applyUnitPropagate =
do
Q ← readQ; assertLiteral (hd Q) False;
Q’ ← readQ; updateQ (tl Q’)
done
"
function (domintros, tailrec) exhaustiveUnitPropagate :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"exhaustiveUnitPropagate =
do
conflictFlag ← readConflictFlag; Q ← readQ;
(if (¬ conflictFlag ∧ Q ≠ []) then
do
applyUnitPropagate;
exhaustiveUnitPropagate
done
)
done
"
by pat_completeness auto
Notice that the termination of the exhaustiveUnitPropagate function is non-trivial, since it is defined by using the general
recursion and it will be discussed later.
4.6. Decision heuristics
When unit propagation is exhausted, no new literal can be inferred and a kind of backtracking searchmust be performed.
This search is driven by the guesses made by the decision heuristic. The heart of the decision heuristic is the selectLiteral
function whose role is to pick a literal whose variable is in the fixed set of decision variables decisionVars, but which is not
yet asserted inM . The literals are selected based on some given criteria.Many different criteria can be used and experimental
evidence shows that this heuristic is often crucial for a solver’s performance. However, in this paper we will specify it only
by its effect given by the following postcondition.
consts selectLiteral :: "Variable set ⇒ State ⇒ Literal × State"
axioms selectLiteral_def:
"let diff = decisionVars \ vars (elements (getM state)) in
diff ≠ ∅ −→ var (selectLiteral decisionVars state) ∈ diff"
definition applyDecide :: "Variable set ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"applyDecide decisionVars =
do
l ← selectLiteral decisionVars;
assertLiteral l True
done
"
4.7. Conflict handling
The conflict handling procedure consists of the conflict analysis, learning and backjumping and it is executed whenever
a conflict occurs at a decision level higher then zero (when the conflict occurs at decision level zero, then the formula is
determined to be unsatisfiable). After the conflict handling procedure, a top portion of trail is removed and a non-conflicting
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state is restored. Unlike the classic backtrack operation which would remove only the last decision made, the backjump
operation performs a form of non-chronological backtracking which undoes as many decisions as possible. Backjumping is
guided by a backjump clause, which is a consequence of the formula F0 and which corresponds to the variable assignment
that led to the conflict. Backjump clauses are constructed in the process called conflict analysis as described in Section 4.7.1.
When the backjump clause is constructed, the top literals from the trailM are removed until the backjump clause becomes
a unit clause inM . From that point, its unit literal is propagated and the search process continues.
Several components of the solver state are used during the conflict handling procedure.
- The clauseC represents the current conflict analysis clause,which becomes the backjump clause once the conflict analysis
process is finished. This clause is characterized by the following invariants.6
Inv[CFalse]:
conflictFlag −→ M ¬ C
Inv[CEntailed]:
conflictFlag −→ F0  C
The following variables represent different aspects of the clause C and are cached in the solver state only for performance
reasons.
- The literal Cl is the last asserted literal of C in the trailM .
Inv[ClDef]:
conflictFlag −→ (isLastAssertedLiteral Cl C M)
- The literal Cll is the last asserted literal of C \ Cl.
Inv[CllDef]:
conflictFlag ∧ C \ Cl ≠ [] −→ (isLastAssertedLiteral Cll (C \ Cl)M)
- The number Cn is the number of literals on the highest decision level of the trailM .
Inv[CnDef]:
conflictFlag −→
Cn = (length (filter (λ l. level l M = currentLevelM) (remdups C)))
4.7.1. Conflict analysis
In order to implement the conflict analysis procedure, we introduce several auxiliary functions.
The function findLastAssertedLiteral is used to set the value of Cl based on the current values of C andM .
definition findLastAssertedLiteral :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"findLastAssertedLiteral =
do
C ← readC; M ← readM;
updateCl (getLastAssertedLiteral (opposite C) (elements M))
done
"
The function countCurrentLevelLiterals is used to set the value of Cn based on the current values of C andM .
definition countCurrentLevelLiterals :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"countCurrentLevelLiterals =
do
M ← readM; C ← readC;
let cl = currentLevel M;
let cll = filter (λ l. elementLevel (opposite l) M = cl) C;
updateCn (length cll)
done
"
6 All invariants that are relevant for the conflict handling process need to hold only until the conflict has been resolved. Therefore, they are guarded by
the condition conflictFlag −→ so that they can be treated as other global invariants.
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Since for some literals asserted at the decision level zero there are no reason clauses in F , it is required that the clause
C does not contain literals from the decision level zero. Also, it is reasonable to require that the clause C does not contain
repeated literals. The function setConflictAnalysisClause sets the clause C to the given one, but first it preprocesses it by
removing duplicates and literals asserted at decision level zero. It also caches the values of Cl and Cn.
definition setConflictAnalysisClause :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"setConflictAnalysisClause clause =
do
M ← readM;
let oppM0 = oppositeLiteralList (elements (prefixToLevel 0 M));
updateC (remdups (list_diff clause oppM0));
findLastAssertedLiteral; countCurrentLevelLiterals
done
"
The conflict analysis algorithm can be described as follows:
- The conflict analysis process starts with a conflict clause itself (the clause of F that is false in M) and the clause C is
initialized to it. The function applyConflict initializes the clause C to the current conflict clause.
definition applyConflict :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"applyConflict =
do
F ← readF; conflictClause ← readConflictClause;
setConflictAnalysisClause (F ! conflictClause)
done
"
- Each literal contained in the current clause C is false in the current trail M and is either a decision made by the search
procedure or the result of some propagation. For each propagated literal l, there is a clause c that caused the propagation.
These clauses are called reason clauses and (isReason c l M) holds. Propagated literals from the current clause C are then
replaced (we say explained) by other literals from the reason clauses, continuing the analysis backwards. The explanation
step can be seen as a resolution between the backjump and the reason clause. The function applyExplain performs this
resolution.
definition applyExplain :: "Literal ⇒ State ⇒ State"
where
"applyExplain literal =
do
reason’ ← readReason literal;
(case reason’ of Some reason ⇒
do
C ← readC; F ← readF;
let res = resolve C (nth F reason) (opposite literal);
setConflictAnalysisClause res
done
)
done
"
Notice that Inv[reasonDef] guarantees that each propagated literal has an assigned reason clause and that the missing
None branch in the case expression is not necessary.
- The conflict analysis procedure we implemented always explains the last asserted literal of C and the procedure is
repeated until the isUIP condition is fulfilled, i.e., until there is exactly one literal in C such that all other literals of C
are asserted at strictly lower decision levels. This condition can be easily checked by examining the value of Cn. The
implementation of this technique is given by the function applyExplainUIP.
function (domintros, tailrec) explainUIP :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"explainUIP =
do
Cn ← readCn;
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(if (Cn ≠ 1) then
do
Cl ← readCl; applyExplain Cl;
explainUIP
done
)
done
"
by pat_completeness auto
Notice that this function is defined by general recursion so its termination is non-trivial and it will be discussed later.
4.7.2. Learning
During the learning process, redundant clauses that are logical consequences of the initial formula F0 are learned. Learned
clauses containing multiple literals are added to the F , while single literal clauses extend the level zero of the trailM . In our
implementation (as is often the case in modern SAT solvers), the only clauses that are being learned are the backjump
clauses. Since we require that all clauses in F have more than two different literals, if a backjump clause C contains only
one literal, then learning is not explicitly performed (it is performed implicitly as a part of the backjumping operation). The
implementation of learning is given by the function applyLearn. After extending F by C , the watch literals for the clause C
are set in a way which ensures Inv[watchDef]. At the same time, the literal Cll is computed and cached.
definition applyLearn :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"applyLearn =
do
C ← readC; Cl ← readCl;
(if (C ≠ [opposite Cl]) then
do
F ← readF; M ← readM;
updateF (F @ [C]);
let l = Cl;
let ll = getLastAssertedLiteral (removeAll l (opposite C)) (elements M);
let clauseIndex = length F;
setWatch1 clauseIndex (opposite l);
setWatch2 clauseIndex (opposite ll);
updateCll ll
done
)
done
"
4.7.3. Backjumping
The backjump operation consists of removing literals from M up to a minimal level in which the backjump clause C
becomes a unit clause, afterwhich its unit literal Cl is propagated. This level is found by using the function getBackjumpLevel.
definition getBackjumpLevel :: "State ⇒ nat × State"
where
"getBackjumpLevel =
do
C ← readC; Cl ← readCl;
(if C = [opposite Cl] then
return 0
else
do
Cll ← readCll; M ← readM;
return (elementLevel Cll M)
done
)
done
"
The function applyBackjump performs the backjump operation itself.
4352 F. Marić / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 4333–4356
definition applyBackjump :: "State ⇒ State"
where
"applyBackjump =
do
level ← getBackjumpLevel; Cl ← readCl; M ← readM; F ← readF;
updateConflictFlag False;
updateQ [];
updateM (prefixToLevel level M);
if (level > 0) then updateReason (opposite Cl) (length F - 1);
assertLiteral (opposite Cl) False
done
"
Notice that after taking the prefix of M , it is concluded that conflict has been successfully resolved (so conflictFlag is
unset), and that there are no unit clauses in F with respect to the taken prefix ofM (so Q is cleared). For these conclusions
to be valid, it is required that no new decisions are made once M is in a conflicting state. Also, unit propagation has to be
exhaustive and no new decisions should be made while there are unit clauses in F . These conditions are imposed by the
following invariants.
Inv[noDecisionsWhenConflict]:
∀level′ < (currentLevelM) −→ (prefixToLevel level′ M) 2¬ F
Inv[noDecisionsWhenUnit]:
∀level′ < (currentLevelM) −→
¬∃c l. c ∈ F ∧ (isUnitClause c l (prefixToLevel level′ M))
5. Highlights of the total correctness proof
The invariants listed in Section 4 are sufficient to prove the total correctness of the procedure. Proving that they are
preserved by all solver functions was the most involved part of the total correctness proof. These proofs are available [14]
and we will not list them here.
Next we will describe the techniques used to prove the termination of our main solver function solve. We will also prove
its total correctness theorem.
5.1. Termination
In the code presented in this paper, only the functions exhaustiveUnitPropagate, explainUIP, and solveLoop are defined
by using general recursion and it is not obvious if they are terminating. The only function that end-users of the solver are
expected to call directly is the function solve as it is the solver’s only entry-point. This means that all three functions defined
by general recursion are called only indirectly by the function solve and all parameters that are passed to them are computed
by the solver. Therefore, these functions can be regarded as partial functions and it is not necessary to show that they
terminate for all possible values of their input parameters. It suffices to show that they terminate for those values of their
input parameters that could actually be passed to them during a solver’s execution starting from the initial state.
We use Isabelle’s built-in features to model this kind of partiality [12].
1. Notice that all three functions are defined by using the tail recursion and annotated by the directive tailrec. This is
a very important feature, and Isabelle can accept these functions whether they terminate or not. However, in order to
generate executable code, the (partial) termination of these functions must be shown.
2. When an n-ary function f is defined by using a general recursion, a predicate f_domwhich tests if an n-tuple (a1, . . . , an)
is in the domain of f (i.e., if f terminates on input (a1, . . . , an)) is automatically generated. If the function definition is
annotated by the directive domintros, Isabelle generates a theorem of the form
g −→ (f_dom (f1(a1), . . . , fn(an))) −→ (f_dom (a1, . . . , an)),
for each recursive call f(f1(a1), . . . , fn(an)) in the definition of f, where g is a guard for this recursive call. Until the
termination of f is proved i.e., until f is proved to be total, the usual induction scheme theorem for the function f (which
would be called f.induct) cannot be proved and used. However, when f is defined a weaker, partial induction scheme
theorem (called f.pinduct) is automatically proved. It differs from the usual induction scheme only because it adds
the domain predicate f_dom both to the induction base and to the induction steps. These domain predicates are then
carried over and assumed in all lemmas about the function f which are proved by (the partial) induction. Still, in order
to complete the whole correctness proof, at one point they have to be discharged. This is done by proving that all inputs
passed to the function f imply the domain predicate.
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In our case, we know that invariants are preserved throughout any solver’s run and that each state for which our solver
functions are called satisfies all given invariants. We show that some of these invariants imply the domain predicates, i.e.,
that our three functions defined by general recursion terminate for states in which these invariants hold.
As an illustration, we will outline the proof that the function exhaustiveUnitPropagate (p4348) terminates if its
input satisfies certain invariants.
In order to prove this, we introduce a well-founded ordering of trails such that applications of applyUnitPropagate
advances, i.e., decreases the trail, in that ordering. So, let us first define an ordering ≻lit of marked literals (it is trivially
well-founded).
Definition 23. l1 ≻lit l2 ←→ (isDecision l1) ∧ ¬(isDecision l2)
Now we can introduce an ordering of trails, which will be used as a basis for the ordering that we are constructing.
Definition 24.
M1 ≻trail M2 ←→ M1 ≻litlex M2,
where≻litlex is a lexicographic extension of relation≻lit .
The function applyUnitPropagate decreases the trail in this ordering (trivially, by the definition of lexicographic extension),
but, unfortunately, this ordering need not be well-founded. However, since invariants hold in every state during the solver’s
operation, we can make a restriction of≻trail that is also well-founded.
Definition 25.
M1 ≻rtrail M2 ←→ (distinctM1) ∧ (varsM1) ⊆ Vbl
(distinctM2) ∧ (varsM2) ⊆ Vbl ∧
M1 ≻trail M2
This is the orderingwewere looking for and nowwe can prove a lemma saying that if the state satisfies certain invariants,
then it is in the domain of the applyUnitPropagate function (i.e., that this function terminates when applied to that state).
Lemma 1. If the set decisionVars is finite and the state s is such that:
(a) Inv[Mconsistent] (p4341) and Inv[Mdistinct] (p4341) hold in s,
(b) Inv[Mvars] (p4341), Inv[Fvars] (p4341), and Inv[Qvars] (p4344) hold in s,
(c) Inv[conflictFlagDef] (p4344), Inv[QDef] (p4344), and Inv[Qdistinct] (p4344) hold in s,
(d) Inv[watchListsDef] (p4345) and Inv[watchListsDistinct] (p4345) hold in s,
(e) Inv[watchesEl] (p4345), Inv[watchesDiffer] (p4345) and
Inv[watchDef] (p4346) hold in s,
then the function exhaustiveUnitPropagate terminates when applied to s, i.e., (exhaustiveUnitPropagate_dom s).
Proof. If Q is empty or conflictFlag is raised in the state s, then the function exhaustiveUnitPropagate terminates and s is
trivially in its domain. So, let us assume that Q is not empty and conflictFlag is false.
The proof is carried out by well-founded induction on the ordering ≻rtrail. Assume, as an inductive hypothesis, that the
statement holds for all states s′ for which s ≻rtrail s′. Let s′ = (applyUnitPropagate s). Since invariants hold in s and are
preserved by the applyUnitPropagate function, they hold in s′ aswell.7 Since the trailM in s′ is extended by a single literal, by
the definition of≻rtrail, it holds that the s ≻rtrail s′. So, by inductive hypothesis, it holds that (exhaustiveUnitPropagate_dom s′).
The lemma then follows from the domain introduction theorem exhaustiveUnitPropagate.domintros:
¬conflictFlag s ∧ Qs ≠ [] −→
(exhaustiveUnitPropagate_dom (applyUnitPropagate s)) −→
(exhaustiveUnitPropagate_dom s). 
Termination (on relevant inputs) of the explainUIP and solveLoop functions is proved in a similar way. The termination
proof for the solveLoop function uses the same ordering ≻rtrail and the termination proof for explainUIP uses the following
well-founded ordering of clauses≻Mclause parametrized by the trailM .
Definition 26.
C1 ≻Mclause C2 ←→ {remdups C1} ≻Mmult {remdups C2},
where {. . .} denotes the multiset of list elements and≻Mmult is the multiset extension of the ordering≻M induced by the listM (e1 ≻M e2 iff e1 occurs after e2 in the list M).
7 Note that only Inv[distinctM], and Inv[varsM] need to hold in order to use the ordering≻rtrail . However, we had to assumemany additional invariants in
the premises of this lemma, because they are needed to show that these three key invariants are preserved when applyUnitPropagate is applied.
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5.2. Total correctness
Total correctness of the solve function is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
((solve F0) = True ∧ (sat F0)) ∨ ((solve F0) = False ∧ ¬(sat F0))
Assuming that all invariants hold in each state reached during the solve function execution, the proof of Theorem 1 relies
on the following two soundness lemmas, which correspond to the two places in the solver code where SATFlag is changed.
Lemma 2. If in some state s it holds that:
(a) Inv[equivalent] (p4341) holds in s,
(b) Inv[conflictFlagDef] (p4344) holds in s,
(c) conflictFlag is true in s,
(d) (currentLevelM) = 0 in s,
then it holds that¬(sat F0).
Proof. From (currentLevel M) = 0 it follows that (prefixToLevel 0 M) = M . Hence, from Inv[equivalent] it follows that
F @ ⟨M⟩ ≡ F0. Since from conflictFlag and Inv[conflictFlagDef] it holds that M ¬ F , by monotonicity it also holds that
M ¬ F @ ⟨M⟩. Since F @ ⟨M⟩  M , the formula F @ ⟨M⟩ is false in a valuation that it entails, so it is unsatisfiable. Since
F0 is logically equivalent to F @ ⟨M⟩, it is also unsatisfiable. 
Lemma 3. If in some state s it holds that:
(a) (vars F0) ⊆ decisionVars,
(b) Inv[Mconsistent] (p4341) holds in s,
(c) Inv[Fvars] (p4341) holds in s,
(d) Inv[equivalent] (p4341) holds in s,
(e) Inv[conflictFlagDef] (p4344) holds in s,
(f) conflictFlag is false in s,
(g) (vars M) ⊇ decisionVars in s,
then (sat F0) and (model M F0) hold.
Proof. From Inv[Fvars], it follows that (vars F) ⊆ (vars F0) ∪ decisionVars. With (vars F0) ⊆ decisionVars, it holds that
(vars F) ⊆ decisionVars. With (vars M) ⊇ decisionVars, it holds that (vars F) ⊆ (vars M) and M is a total valuation
with respect to the variables of F . Therefore, it is either the case that M ¬ F or M  F . Since conflictFlag is false, by
Inv[conflictFlagDef] it holds that M 2¬ F , so it must be the case that M  F . It trivially holds that M  ⟨ prefixToLevel 0M⟩ andM is consistent by Inv[Mconsistent]. Therefore M is a model for F @ ⟨ prefixToLevel 0M⟩. Since F0 ≡ F @ ⟨ prefixToLevel 0M⟩,
it holds that M is also a model for F0 and (sat F0) holds. 
6. Discussion on proof management
Although it is hard to quantify the efforts invested in this work, we can estimate it to be around one man-year. The proof
scripts are around 25000 lines of Isabelle code and the generated PDF proof documents are around 700 pages long. These
numbers are of course heavily dependent on the indentation style used. Proof-checking time by Isabelle is under 5 min on a
1.6 GHz/512MB RAMmachine running Linux.We estimate that careful investigation of the proof text and its reorganization
mainly by extracting some common parts of different proofs into lemmas could lead to 10%–20% reductions.
During this verification effort some interesting technical issues arose. In order to make such a large-scale verification
effort possible, it was necessary to introduce some kind of modularity to the formalization. The crucial step in this direction
was to prove the properties of abstract state transition systems for SAT [20,11] and then use these proofs in the correctness
proof of the low-level implementation presented here. A good direction to followwould be to define internal data-structures
(for example the assertion trail) as abstract data-types (ADT) with some desired properties given axiomatically. Although,
unfortunately, this has not been explicitly done in our formalization, this idea has been followed to some extent. Namely,
after introducing basic definitions, we showed lemmas that could be regarded as axioms of the ADT and all further proofs
relied only on those lemmas,without using the low-level properties of the implementation. This, of course, enables changing
the low-level implementation into a more efficient one without changing much of the whole correctness proof. We think
that explicit encoding of the ADT approach (for example by using type-classes or locales [21]) would lead to even more
flexible formalization and is a step in the right direction.
When proving properties about recursively defined functions we had a dilemma whether to repeat the same induction
scheme in proofs ofmany similar lemmas (one for each property of the recursive function) or to formulate one bigger lemma
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that groups all assumptions and conclusions for several properties that are being shown. We took the second approach and
reduced the total number of lemmas and the total size of proofs, but the price that had to be payed is that we lost track of
which assumptions are effectively used for proving a specific conclusion. For example, most of our high-level lemmas that
show that invariants are preserved by the function calls assume that all invariants hold before the function call and show
that all invariants hold after the function call. The only way to find out which invariants are necessary to hold before the
function call so that a specific invariant holds is after it is reading the proof texts which can be a tedious task.
7. Related work
First steps towards verification of SAT and related SMT solvers have been recentlymade. Shankar hasmechanically proved
soundness, completeness, and decidability of propositional logic (by means of a satisfiability solver) [22]. Zhang and Malik
have informally proved correctness of a modern SAT solver [26]. Abstract state transition systems [20,11] describe high-
level operation of modern SAT solvers and the authors have informally proved their correctness. Marić and Janičić have
mechanically verified the classic DPLL procedure by shallow embedding into Isabelle/HOL [16]. Lescuyer and Conchon have
mechanically verified a classic DPLL based SAT solver within the system Coq [13]. Shankar and Vaucher have mechanically
verified a higher level description of a modern DPLL procedure within the system PVS. Marić has previously given [15] a
tutorial exposure of the modern SAT solving techniques (both high and low level) with correctness properties formulated
in a Hoare-style framework and proved (to some extent) mechanically within the system Isabelle.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents a full mechanical proof of the total correctness
(soundness, termination and completeness) of a SAT solver implementation that covers bothmodern high-level SAT solving
algorithms (e.g., conflict-driven learning) and low-level implementation techniques (most notably the two-watched literal
propagation scheme).
8. Further work
The specification of the SAT solver given in this paper is such that a fully executable code in a functional language can be
automatically generated from it, providing that an executable decision heuristic is supplied. However, the efficiency of the
generated code must still be improved, if we want to get a competitive solver.
First, there are several low-level algorithmic improvements that have to be made. For example, in the current
implementation, checking if a literal is true in a trail M requires performing a linear-time scan through the list. Most real-
world solvers cache truth values of all literals in an array and so allow a constant time check. Also, the conflict analysis phase
is expressed here in a bit more abstract way then in implementations of MiniSat style solvers.
Next, some higher-level heuristics have to be implemented more carefully. For example, we have only made tests with a
trivial decision heuristic that selects a randomundefined literal, but in order to have a usable solver, amore involved decision
heuristic (e.g., the MiniSat one) should be used. It would also be useful to implement forgetting and restarting techniques
[11,20].
Although these modifications require us to invest more work, we believe that they are straightforward. However, the
most problematic issue is the fact that because of the pure functional nature of HOL no side-effects are possible and there
can be no destructive updates of data-structures. It is possible to adapt the code generator to generate monadic Haskell and
imperative ML code which would lead to huge efficiency benefits since it allows mutable references and arrays. We hope
that with these modifications, the generated code could become comparable to real-world SAT solvers and this would be
the main direction of our further work.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a formalization and a total correctness proof of a MiniSAT-like SAT solver within the
system Isabelle/HOL. The solver is based on the DPLL procedure and employs most state-of-the-art SAT solving techniques
including the conflict-guided backjumping, clause learning and the two-watched unit propagation scheme. The described
solver specification can serve as a basis for implementation of an efficient and correct SAT solver. One possible approach
for that would be to manually implement a SAT solver (in an imperative programming language) by strictly following the
descriptions of the solver given in this paper. However, the highest possible level of trust could be achieved only if fully
executable code (in a functional programming language) is automatically generated by using the Isabelle’s built-in code
generator. Although this has been done, the efficiency of generated code should further be improved and that is the field of
our future research. We hope that this work can facilitate a better understanding of modern SAT solvers. The final product
of this research will be a trusted and efficient SAT solver that can be used either independently or as a kernel for checking
results of other untrusted verifiers.We also hope that thiswork shows that, thanks to recent advances in both automated and
semi-automated software verification technology, it is possible to have a fully verified implementation of a very non-trivial
software system.
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